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Abstract
Peer-to-peer content dissemination applications suffer
immensely from freeriders, i.e., nodes that do not provide
their fair share. The Tit-for-Tat (TfT) incentives have re-
ceived much attention as they help make such systems more
robust against freeriding. However, these rely on an asym-
metric component, namely opportunistic pushes, that let
peers receive content without sending anything in return.
Opportunistic push constitutes the Achilles’ heel of TfT-
based protocols as illustrated by the fact that all known at-
tacks against them exploit it. This problem becomes even
more serious when used by colluding freeriders.
In this paper, we discuss the possibility of using ac-
countability to secure gossip-based dissemination protocols
based on asymmetric exchanges. The fact that gossip pro-
tocols are dynamic and randomized makes our approach
robust against collusion and alleviates the need for cryp-
tography. We present the challenges raised by an auditing
approach and give insights into how to build a freerider-
tracking protocol for gossip-based content dissemination.
1. Introduction
High-bandwidth content dissemination applications are
becoming increasingly popular over the Internet. For obvi-
ous scalability reasons, the tendency has been shifting to-
ward the use of the peer-to-peer paradigm with its efficient
distributed protocols. These include multi tree-based pro-
tocols such as [3], mesh-based protocols such as [4], and
gossip-based protocols such as [5, 6, 12]. Such dissemina-
tion protocols highly rely on the willingness of peers to col-
laborate, i.e., to devote a fraction of their resources – specif-
ically their upload bandwidth – to the system.
Not surprisingly, such systems are vulnerable to freerid-
ers, i.e., peers that do not contribute their fair share [10].
Freeriding is a common behavior in large-scale systems de-
ployed in the public domain [1]. The impact of freeriders is
even higher when they collude, i.e., when they collaborate
to favor both their individual and common interests.
Two orthogonal approaches have been considered to
cope with freeriding: incentive and coercive mechanisms.
While the first incites peers to share their resources by mak-
ing their profits proportional to their contribution, the latter
punishes peers that do not collaborate. The Tit-for-Tat (TfT)
incentive mechanism, where content is exchanged only be-
tween peers with mutual interest, is a simple and efficient
way to discourage freeriders in a system where dissemi-
nation is symmetric, i.e., the exchanges between pairs of
peers are balanced and bidirectional [4, 12]. Yet, this re-
quires a complementary optimistic component, i.e., nodes
altruistically pushing content to other nodes without requir-
ing anything in return. The optimistic component, namely
the asymmetric communication, is vulnerable to specific
attacks as we will discuss later. On the other hand, ac-
countability, i.e., logging peers’ actions for further verifi-
cations, provides a powerful coercive mechanism. How-
ever, none of the proposed solutions [12] is applicable to
randomized algorithms such as epidemic protocols without
using asymmetric cryptography (which is both expensive
and non-scalable).
We believe that a verification mechanism, inspired by
accountability and acting as a coercive mechanism, can (i)
lead to a fair system on its own and (ii) be a relevant com-
plement to collaboration incentives based on bidirectional
exchanges such as TfT. In fact, the fear of being detected
can itself act as an incentive not to misbehave: consider a
non-zero probability of being detected when misbehaving
and that detection leads to some punishment (e.g., a penalty
or exclusion). In this case, nodes might want to cooperate
by providing their fair share. However, designing a verifica-
tion mechanism to detect possibly colluding freeriders in a
content dissemination system based on random peer selec-
tion without cryptography raises the following challenges:
(i) how to verify that a peer contributes its fair share when
the set of peers to which it is supposed to upload data may
not be predictable (randomness of peer selection)? ; (ii) how
to use untrusted logs (no cryptography) in the presence of
colluding peers that can mutually cover each other up? ; (iii)
how to distinguish between a message lost by the network
and a message dropped on purpose by a freerider?
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This paper proposes a new fully decentralized approach
to address these issues. In addition to securing the wide
class of epidemic protocols, our approach can be used as a
complement to existing solutions designed for dissemina-
tion protocols based on bidirectional exchanges. Currently,
such protocols, e.g., BitTorrent [4] or BAR Gossip [12],
include an opportunistic unchoking mechanism, necessary
in TfT-based dissemination protocols, which ends up being
their Achilles’ heel in the presence of freeriders [13, 14], as
nodes can be served without contributing. We present our
approach in the context of a generic gossip-based protocol,
where data is disseminated in a random manner following
an asymmetric push scheme, as opposed to symmetric ex-
changes where a balance between the interests of a pair of
nodes can be achieved by means of TfT. Moreover, gossip-
based protocols are increasingly popular and have been suc-
cessfully applied to streaming [6] and file sharing [5], two
of the most attractive Internet applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews related work. Section 3 clearly positions our ap-
proach with respect to previous work and motivates our
work. Section 4 describes the general context and exposes
the proposed approach. Section 5 concludes.
2. Related Work
The novel approach proposed in this paper aims at pre-
venting freeriding in epidemic content dissemination proto-
cols via coercion. It is related to the following recent work.
Incentives have been broadly used to deal with freerid-
ers in file sharing systems such as BitTorrent [4] by mak-
ing the benefits of the peers proportional to their contribu-
tion to the system. However, there exists several attacks
to the popular Tit-for-Tat incentive which allows freeriders
to download content without any contribution to the sys-
tem [13,14], mainly by taking advantage of peers’ generos-
ity, engendered by the opportunistic unchokingmechanism.
PeerReview [7] deals with malicious nodes via an ac-
countability approach. Peers maintain verifiable signed logs
of their actions that can be audited and checked using a
simulator of the application, i.e., a reference implementa-
tion, run at each peer (in addition to the application). While
powerful and highly generic, PeerReview is not applicable
to non-deterministic protocols whose execution relies on
randomized algorithms. Recent work proposed CSAR [2],
based on verifiable random functions that allow account-
ability of randomized algorithms, but it is implemented by
means of asymmetric cryptography primitives.
Indeed, the inherent randomness of epidemic protocols
makes it difficult to make these protocols robust. Several so-
lutions have been proposed, mainly in the context of stream-
ing applications. Li et al. proposed BAR Gossip [12] and
its improvement FlightPath [11], a gossip-based streaming
Name Exchanges Overlay Crypto.
PeerReview [7] any any yes
Bar Gossip [12] symmetric dynamic yes
Distributed auditing [8] asymmetric static no
Table 1. Summary of related work
application resilient to rational nodes, i.e., nodes that con-
tribute only if they perceive a benefit in return. Random-
ness is handled as in CSAR. BAR Gossip is composed of
opportunistic pushes performed by altruistic nodes (essen-
tial for the efficiency of the protocol) and balanced pairwise
exchanges based on a TfT mechanism made robust using
cryptographic primitives. Therefore, it cannot be used to
make protocols based only on optimistic pushes, such as
the ones considered in this paper, robust against freeriders.
The two approaches that are most closely related to ours
are the distributed auditing protocol proposed by Haridasan
et al. in [8] and the passive monitoring protocol proposed by
Karakya et al. in [9]. The first protocol targets live stream-
ing applications. Freeriders are detected by cross-checking
their neighbors reports. The latter focuses on gossip-based
search in the Gnutella network. The peers monitor the way
their neighbors forward/answer queries in order to detect
freeriders and peers who drop queries. Yet, contrarily to
gossip-based content dissemination – which is based on ran-
dom peer selection – in both protocols, the peers’ neighbor-
hoods are static, i.e., they form a fixed mesh overlay. There-
fore, the situation where colluding peers mutually cover up
for each other (not addressed by the authors) makes such
monitoring protocols unusable.
Table 1 summarizes the related work and highlights its
main characteristic.
3. Motivation
Since its successful application in BitTorrent the Tit-for-
Tat (TfT) incentives have become a de facto standard for
dealing with freeriders in large scale content distribution
systems. BAR Gossip – and by extension FlightPath – is
the most successful and complete application including TfT
to ensure fair collaboration of participants in the context of
gossip protocols. However, it suffers from several issues
that drastically limit both its efficiency and its practicality
in a large-scale content dissemination system.
First, BAR Gossip makes intensive use of both symmet-
ric and asymmetric cryptography. Beyond the fact that this
adds a non negligible overhead to the protocol, both in terms
of message exchanges and computation, it requires a trusted
third party to issue identification certificates, namely a pub-
lic key infrastructure. In addition to requiring prior registra-
tion, asymmetric cryptography techniques generate a high
load, proportional to the size of the network, on the cen-
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tralized server. Further, it is shown in [8] that BAR Gossip
collapses when the system grows beyond a given size.
Second, similarly to TfT-based protocols, BAR Gossip
relies on altruistic nodes and opportunistic pushes where
nodes upload pieces of data without receiving anything in
exchange. This component is essential for TfT to work in a
real life setting mainly to ensure that nodes joining the sys-
tem can gain bargaining power (i.e., pieces to exchange) to
initiate symmetric exchanges but also to ensure that nodes
with low upload capacities are unchoked (which is unlikely
in bidirectional exchanges, as nodes with high upload band-
width are preferred). In general, this component is used
without any protection against freeriders despite the fact
that most attacks to TfT actually exploit it. This shows that
protocols using TfT are still sensitive to freeriders and that
the problem of designing incentives for the wide class of
epidemic dissemination protocols (to which the opportunis-
tic pushes belong) is of the utmost importance in fighting
against freeriders. In BAR Gossip this issue is addressed
by forcing the peers that are opportunistically unchoked to
send the exact same amount of data they received, should
they send junk data if they have nothing of interest. This
results in a waste of bandwidth. Although it is acceptable
in BAR Gossip since nodes can often initiate balanced ex-
changes, the proposed solution cannot be applied in a sys-
tem based exclusively on asymmetric exchanges.
Third, protocols such as BAR Gossip are extremely vul-
nerable to the presence of colluding nodes. The first reason
for this is that the game theory at the core of BAR Gossip
does not handle teams of players, but an even larger prob-
lem is that the opportunistic component is alone sufficient
for achieving very good performance when exploited by a
coalition. Assuming a set of colluding freeriders (poten-
tially hosted on a high speed network or even on the same
machine) that take advantage of the opportunistic compo-
nent to obtain pieces for free (or against a small amount
of junk data) and then share these pieces among the coali-
tion, the stream can be downloaded with a small contribu-
tion in return. This situation where nodes collude is not
captured by the BAR model which considers rational nodes
to be nodes willing to contribute as long as this generates
profit in return without attention to the nodes with which
they collaborate.
These reasons motivate the need for a lightweight track-
ing system for gossip-based content dissemination proto-
cols. Accountability appears as a promising solution in this
context. Yet, introducing accountability in gossip proto-
cols is very challenging for several reasons: such protocols
are inherently random, dynamic and rely on asymmetric ex-
changes that prevent the use of game theory. These intrinsic
properties of gossip raise the following challenges: (i) to
deal with randomness in partner selection, (ii) to rely on
untrusted logs (no cryptography) in the presence of collud-
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Figure 1. Three-phase gossip protocol
ing nodes that can mutually cover each other up, and (iii)
to distinguish between a message lost by the network and a
message dropped on purpose by a freerider.
From the previous discussion, we conclude that the un-
derlying dynamic overlay, randomness, collusion, and trust
are the main issues faced when dealing with freeriders in
gossip-based systems. Interestingly enough, the dynamic
overlay and the randomness of gossip can help in address-
ing the other two issues. In static mesh networks, nodes
pick a set of neighbors and keep them for the duration of
the system lifetime or until a problem arises, in which case
the node might add nodes to its neighborhood or replace
the malfunctioning ones by possibly bootstrapping again.
Therefore, as explained above, colluding nodes can build a
sub-network within the network as a whole and exploit hon-
est nodes. Such an attack is difficult to detect as colluding
nodes would cover each other up, making any verification
system useless. However, this attack cannot be performed
in a system where nodes pick their neighbors at random
and renew their neighborhood at a high frequency. Based
on this line of reasoning, we propose an approach based
on distributed verification coupled with a statistical audit-
ing protocol ensuring that the underlying dynamic overlay
and randomness of the gossip protocol are respected.
4. Lightweight freerider-tracking in gossip
In this section, we briefly present the illustrative and
widely known example of the three-phase gossip protocol
for content dissemination and list the freeriding opportuni-
ties in such a protocol. We then explore the design space of
distributed freerider-tracking protocols based on the ratio-
nale presented in the previous section.
We consider a system where some content, divided into
chunks, is broadcast from a source to all nodes using a
gossip-based protocol. In short, each node periodically pro-
poses the set of chunks it received during the last gossip pe-
riod to a fixed-size set of f random nodes. Upon receipt of
a proposal, a node tells the sender which chunk it needs and
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the sender then pushes the requested chunks. These three
phases are illustrated in Figures 1(a)-1(b).
Looking at each of the three phases, it can be seen that a
freerider can decrease its contribution in only four ways: (i)
decreasing its gossip period in order to increase the proba-
bility that the nodes to which it proposes the chunks already
have them; (ii) decreasing the number of nodes to which it
sends proposals; (iii) not sending the chunks it proposed;
(iv) biasing the selection of partners. The aim of the last at-
tack is twofold: first, it increases the benefit of the coalition
by uploading content only to colluding nodes; and second,
it decreases the chance of colluding freeriders being caught
by covering each other up in case of verification.
It can be concluded from this list of attacks that a dis-
tributed verification mechanism must ensure that the nodes
propagate the chunks they received to at least f randomly
chosen nodes, on time. Note that this is an orthogonal
approach to verification for symmetric exchange protocols
which ensure that transfers are bidirectional. To ensure cor-
rect propagation of the chunks, the sender checks that the
chunks which it sent are proposed in turn to other nodes.
When a node p1 receives chunks from a node p0, p1 must
provide p0 with the list of the f nodes to which it proposed
these chunks. Node p0 assesses the validity of the list by
polling the f alleged recipients. In addition, the nodes that
receive a proposal from p1 and requested some chunks in
return check whether p1 indeed sends the requested chunks.
Such a scheme is efficient only if the verifiers are honest.
Based on the fact that not all nodes will cover up for a given
node, verifying that a node interacts with a large subset of
the network ensures the efficiency of the distributed verifi-
cation. This comes down to assessing the randomness of a
node’s past collaborators. To this end, each node maintains
a log of the nodes with which it collaborated in the last h
seconds. The randomness (with respect to a uniform dis-
tribution) is assessed using statistical goodness-of-fit tests
such as entropy-based tests, the χ2 test or the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. The validity of the log is assessed by polling
all or a subset of the nodes that appear in the log. Note
that statistical verification ensures that the contribution of a
node is evenly spread in the network and not only in a small
subset of colluding nodes.
Nodes’ behavior is evaluated by the nodes themselves,
and since they are changing at each gossip period, their
evaluations must be compiled into a consistent score. When
nodes detect a misbehavior, they emit blames containing a
negative score proportional to the severity of the detected
misbehavior. Two issues arise from this. First, a node might
be wrongfully blamed due to message losses. In order to
avoid false positives, nodes must thus dynamically adjust
the scores of their peers so that the average score of hon-
est nodes is zero on average. Second, the decision mecha-
nism which determines if a node should be punished or not,
based on its score, should only consider absolute scores, i.e.,
not comparing the scores of the nodes, otherwise freeriders
would have interest in wrongfully blaming honest nodes.
With absolute scores and a given threshold, freeriders have
no interest in blaming honest nodes, as it would result in
worse overall performance. This phenomenon is known as
the tragedy of the commons.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we highlighted the limitations of Tit-for-
Tat as an incentive for peer collaboration in the presence of
freeriders, especially when they collude. We motivated a
new approach for securing asymmetric exchanges (includ-
ing optimistic pushes of TfT-based protocols) and proposed
a mechanism based on gossip, alleviating the need for cryp-
tography. Preliminary results are very encouraging, and we
plan to pursue our work in the direction of a fully-fledged
lightweight freerider-tracking system.
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